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“I picture a future for writing that 
dispenses with mystery wherever it can, 
that embraces the astounding strides in 
thought-organ research. Ideally, a future 
where neuroimaging both miniaturises 
and becomes widespread, augmenting 
the craft of authors, critics, agents and 
publishing houses.” 
D.G. Walter
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  At a time when different mediator-fields in cultural discourse 
(including curatorial practice, ‘arts plastiques’ theory, but also the more hetero-
dox corners of cognitive science such as cognitive archaeology) are attentive 
to the intersections of the eye and the hand, the hand and the brain, the virtual 
and the neuronal (without necessarily glorifying these intersections as some 
new immaterial utopia or decrying them as a final stage in human alienation) 
it may be helpful to achieve some clarity with regards to neuroaesthetic 
programs. I suggest a distinction between three neuroaesthetics, which I’ll 
term for the sake of convenience, the positivist, the idealist, and the militant. 
  Positivist neuroaesthetics seeks to locate cerebral areas 
and correlate them with cognitive and extend cultural functions such as 
those observed on the walls of major art museums. In a species of category 
mistakenly reminiscent of evolutionary psychology with its appeals to 
paleolithic affective life, this form of neuroaesthetics seeks to tell us, 
factually, that Cubism is “the way we actually see.” 3Here, notions such 
as artistic practice, representation, truth and the activity of the brain itself 
are quite thin. The problem is only magnified when the focus of positivist 
neuroaesthetics turns away from ‘science’ to facilitating the production of, 
e.g., literature. We then find pronouncements such as these: “I picture a future 
for writing that dispenses with mystery wherever it can, that embraces the 
astounding strides in thought-organ research. Ideally, a future where neuroim-
aging both miniaturises and becomes widespread, augmenting the craft 
of authors, critics, agents and publishing houses.”4
  In contrast, a more idealist neuroaesthetics does not seek 
to “explain” one field, e.g. painting, by another field such as neuroanatomy 
aided by neuroimaging. Rather, in a stronger recognition of plasticity, without 
claiming to be a ‘science’ explaining cultural production – not least given 
a kind of historical overdetermination and sedimentation of perception – it 
emphasizes, like Deleuze, that “Creating new circuits in art means creating 
them in the brain.”5 A more naturalist version of this position would appeal 
to the notion of ‘scaffolding,’ according to which we are inseparable, as Andy 
Clark put it, from the “looping interactions” between our brains, our bodies, 
and “complex cultural and technological environments.”6
  Militant neuroaesthetics share with the idealist form a 
commitment to a kind of ontological monism in which the aesthetic and the 
neuronal occur on one shared plane, without either hierarchy or one being 
more fundamental than the other. But it adds the impetus to precisely “create 
new circuits.” Whether it is in the form of an artistic intervention, a curatorial 
practice, or a theoretical statement, the militant neuroesthète makes use of “the 
histories, critiques, practices, apparatuses, spaces, and non-spaces and tempo-
ralities of artistic practice”7 as these manifest themselves in painting, sculpture, 
performance, film, video, and installation art, “to counter these arguments and 
instead incite a different truth production program or alternative paradigm 
at odds with institutional practices.” Here we find projects as diverse as Neid-
ich’s visual and/or cognitive ergonomics, and the still-unexplored Vygotskyan 
project to connect political reform to knowledge of the cortex.8 Again, like the 
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more idealist form of neuroaesthetics, these do hold that “the power of art 
is to create additionally evolving forms of variability in the environment that 
couple with the equally diverse forms of the brain’s own variability” (Neidich, 
Glossary of Cognitive Activism). Yet they add a meliorist project of the 
production of alternate zones of affect and perception, with implications 
for a distancing from mainstream social production (like the notion of the 
“distribution of the sensible”).
  The promise and the paradox of a militant neuroaesthetics 
is quite similar to that of another intriguing yet at times nebulous concept, 
cognitive capitalism, because both share a duality of the normative and the 
natural, the virtual and the actual, the avant-garde and the status quo. That 
is, cognitive capitalism is both (a) a description of an actual, ‘second nature’ 
status quo in which our brains are a key component of our labor (the system 
of exploitation correspondingly targets this fact) and (b) a project to overcome 
this state of affairs with a normative, virtual impetus to create increasing 
difference and disturbance in the network. Militant neuroaesthetics (including 
“cognitive activism”) seeks to take advantage of the fact of our plasticity 
and interrelation with social and cultural forms to create “new forms of 
variability.” This is a far cry from neuro-advice for writers and publishers, 
or scientists claiming to discover laws of aesthetic experience.
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COGNITIVE ACTIVISM Understands, first and 
foremost, that the doctrines, apparatuses, and means 
for achieving political resistance, including street 
demonstrations and sit-ins, were invented in the 
late 19th century and early 20th century. They were 
based on responses to labor practices and conditions 
associated with industrial capitalism or Fordism such 
as repetition, boredom, low pay, and poor working 
conditions. Post-industrial capitalism creates a very 
different series of stresses within labor. This now takes 
place on computer terminals and includes: precarity, 
real subsumption, software substitution for lower-end 
and less-skilled jobs, work replacement technology, 
fragmented worker scripts, exacerbated income 
inequality, and code-generated surplus value. Recently, 
there has emerged a materialist component to cognitive 
capitalism in which what is at stake is the premeditated 
institutional sculpting of the brain’s neural plasticity. 
Cognitive activism is a call for the creation of new set 
of strategies, in addition to those already in use by the 
proletariat, with which to combat the dispositifs 
of control and normalization faced by the cognitariat 
in our accelerated age of the anthropocene.
